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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20080771-CA

vs.
MARVIN BROWN,
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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in allowing Marvin Brown's prior convictions to be
admitted as evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, % 24, 52 P.3d 1194; see also
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^ 18, 993 P.2d 837. This issue was preserved in a timely
objection made by defense counsel (R. 182: 9-15, 17-18).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's

Brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The Defendant, Marvin Brown, appeals from the judgment, sentence and
commitment of the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court, after he was
convicted by a jury of retail theft, a third degree felony.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Marvin Brown, Jr. was charged by criminal information filed on July 25, 2007 in
Fourth District Court with one count of retail theft with prior convictions, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-602, and 76-6-412 respectively (R.
01). At the preliminary hearing held on September 25, 2007, the Court found probable
cause and the charge was bound over for trial (R. 24-22).
On March 3, 2008 Brown made a motion for a bifurcated trial (R. 38-37). The
defendant requested that the court bifurcate the retail theft portion of the trial from the
prior convictions portion of the trial and prohibit any information regarding prior
convictions from being presented to the jury based on it being unduly prejudicial and
inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The State did
not have a response and a notice to submit for decision was made on May 2, 2008 (R.
57).
On May 13, 2008, the State filed notice of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence (R.
74-73). The State argued it was allowed to show evidence of prior convictions to prove
Brown's intent, and also to show an absence of mistake or accident (R. 73).
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At the pretrial conference on May 13, 2008, the trial court granted the motion to
bifurcate and decided to address the issue of admissibility of the prior convictions under
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) on the morning of the first day of trial (R. 181: 3-6).
On June 4, 2008, the jurytrial commenced (R. 78-77). Prior to seating the jury, the
court heard arguments on the motion to enter the defendant's prior conviction under Utah
Rules of Evidence 404(b) (R. 5-18). Defense counsel preserved the issue for appeal with
a timely objection statmg that the prior conviction was not similar enough to prove intent
and that a defense of mistake or accident had not been asserted by the defendant (R. 182:
9-15, 17-18). The trial court ruled the evidence admissible with a limiting instruction to
the jury (R. 182: 18). The limiting instruction, which was given at the time of admission
and again prior to jury deliberations, stated:
"You are instructed that any and all evidence relating to the defendant's prior
commission and conviction of retail theft in 2006 is only admitted for the purpose
of attempting to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, preparation, common
plan or scheme, or absence of mistake or accidents as to the present retail theft
charge facing the defendant. Specifically evidence of the prior conviction cannot
be considered as proof of character or a propensity to commit theft"
(R. 182: 189).
After two days of trial and approximately two and a half hours of deliberation, the
jury returned a guilty verdict (R. 100-99, 110). Brown then stipulated to the prior
convictions for purposes of the bifurcated trial and making a record of findings as to prior
conviction (R. 99, 182: 337-339).
On July 22, 2008, Brown was given a suspended sentence of one to five years in
prison, ordered to spend 150 days in the Utah County Jail with credit granted for time
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served, placed on probation for 36 months, and given a suspended fine of $5000 (R. 145142).
On August 29, 2008, notice of appeal was filed with the Fourth Distiict Court (R.
151).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Jerry McCann
Jerry McCann is a loss prevention officer at Macey's Groceiy Store (R. 182: 131).
On June 19, 2007 he observed Marvin Brown, Jr. looking at batteries via a security
camera (R. 182: 132). He observed Brown select three packages of batteries and slide
them under a box of chicken from the deli section (R. 182: 135). He then saw Brown
walk toward the back of the store, then walk up the middle aisle and approach a
checkstand (R. 182: 136).
On the camera he saw Brown walk through the checkstand, point to the box of
chicken and begin to walk out of the store (R. 182: 136). He then stopped Brown before
the store exit and asked him if he had any Macey's merchandise he had not paid for (R.
182: 139). Brown pulled out the batteries and told him he was looking for his father (R.
182: 143).
He escorted Brown to a security room to be detained. (R. 182: 143). When
questioned as to why he took the batteries, Brown replied that he was lookmg for his
father (R. 182: 144). When further questioned as to why he didn't leave the batteries in
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the store and go look for his father or tell the checker about the batteries as he walked
through, Brown said, "I don't know." (R. 182: 144).
B. Testimony of Katie Williams
Katie Williams was formerly a cashier at Macey's Grocery Store in Pleasant
Grove, Utah and was working on June 19, 2007 (R. 182: 179-181). On that day. Brown
entered her checkstand and when asked if he was ready to be rung up, he pointed to a
receipt and continued to walk through the checkout; she assumed he had aheady paid and
let him continue (R. 182: 182). She only saw the chicken in his hand (R. 182: 185-186).
She also testified that he appeared to be looking around for someone (R. 182: 184-185).
C. Testimony of Mike Doyl
Mike Doyl is a police officer with Payson City Police Department (R. 182: 188).
On November 16, 2006 he responded to Wal-Mart in Payson (R. 182: 190). Upon
arriving he interviewed Brown, who had been detained by a loss prevention officer, and
Brown told him that he had come to the store to return some items and had been given
pink stickers for those items, however, instead of returning them he took the sticker off
and placed it on a different item from the electronics section (R. 182: 190-191). He told
Officer Doyl he had attempted to leave the store and was stopped by the loss prevention
officer outside of the store (R. 182: 192). Brown pled guilty to the charge resulting from
the incident (R. 182: 194).
D. Testimony of Anthony Howell
Anthony Howell is an attorney and also a shopper at the Pleasant Grove Macey's
Grocery Store (R. 182: 224-225). He testified as to the layout of the store, the batteries
5

section particularly, and his recent purchase of a variety of different batteries from this
section (R. 182: 225-230). He described the store's exit and also the items for sale outside
of the store's exit (R. 182: 230-231).
E. Testimony of Marvin Brown, Sr.
Marvin Brown, Sr. is the defendant's father and was with the defendant in
Macey's on June 19, 2007 (R. 182: 238-239). He and his son went to the store to
purchase some chicken (R. 182: 239). After purchasing the chicken at the deli, he told his
son that he had forgotten to pick up some gravy and that he would meet at the truck (R.
182: 240). He handed Marvin, Jr. the chicken and the receipt (R. 182: 240). He found the
gravy and purchased it at the checkout (R. 182: 241). He saw Marvin, Jr. waiting at the
front doors and decided to sneak up on him and surprise him (R. 182: 241-242). At that
point a man cut in between him and his son and began questioning Mamn about whether
or not he had anything he had not paid for (R. 182: 242). After trying to approach his son
and the store employee, he was told to move out of the way (R. 182: 242).
F. Testimony of Marvin Brown, Jr.
Marvin Brown, Jr. is the defendant (R. 182: 248). On June 19, 2007 he was in
Macey's Grocery Store in Pleasant Grove (R. 182: 248). He and his father went into the
store to purchase a chicken (R. 182: 249). After purchasing the chicken, his father told
him he forgot something and left to go pick it up. He decided to surprise his dad by
picking up some batteries that his dad needed for a laser light (R. 182: 249). His father
had looked at several other stores and had been unable to find the particular batteries (R.
182:250-251).
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He thought he would find the batteries and meet his father at the checkout to give
him the batteries he had found for him to purchase (R. 182: 251). After finding the
batteries he went through the store looking for his father and thought he saw him standing
near the exit and went to go meet him (R. 182: 252). He walked through the checkstand
and told the cashier that his father was right there (R. 182: 252). He thought he told her
about the batteries at that time (R. 182: 252, 260). After walking through to where he
thought he saw his father he couldn't see his dad anymore, he then walked over to look
out at his truck to see if his dad was there (R. 182: 252).
After looking at his truck, he went to turn around and was approached by McCann,
the loss prevention officer (R. 182: 252). After McCann asked him if he had anything that
he had not paid for he pulled out the batteries from under the box of chicken (R. 182:
252-253). Then he was asked to follow McCann upstairs (R. 182: 253).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse Marvin Brown conviction based on the trial court's
error in admitting evidence of prior convictions under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. The prior convictions did not prove intent or absence of
mistake/accident, and their prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
BROWN'S PHIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER RULES 404(b) AND 403 OF
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
"It is of course fundamental in our law that a peison can be convicted only foi acts

committed and not uecause of geneial charactei 01 piochvity to commit bad acts " State
v Reed, 2000 UT 68, ^f 23, 8 P 3d 1025 Utah Courts have long iecogmzed the piejudicial
effect of puor conviction evidence Salt Lake City v Struhs, 2004 UT App 489, ^f 14, 106
P 3d 188 The Utah Supieme Court has stated, uWe do not doubt that 'evidence of pnoi
convictions and othei bad acts has tiemendous potential to sway the findei of fact
unfaiily" and mcieases the likelihood of comiction " State \ hloiez, 111 P 2d 452 459
(Utah 1989), see also State v Holder, 694 P 2d 583, 584 (Utah 1984) (pei cunam)
(Stating cc[s]uch evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used with extieme
caution because of the prejudicial effect it may have on the findei of fact") Foi this
reason there are "rigorous criteria" foi admitting evidence of other dimes oi wiongs
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence United States \ Cuch, 842 F 2d
1173, 1176 (10th Cir 1988)
When analyzmg admissibility of bad-acts evidence, a trial court must determine
(1) whether evidence is being offered foi a proper, non-charactei purpose, (2) whether
such evidence is relevant, and (3) whether evidence must be excluded as more prejudicial
than probative Utah R Evid 402, 403, 404(b), State v Rees, 2004 UT App 51, % 2, 88
P 3d 359 (citing State v Decorso, 1999 UT 57,1f 20, 993 P 2d 837, cert denied, 528 U S
1164, 120 SCt 1181 (2002))
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"Even if evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose and is relevant,
the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence wis substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfan* prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.5" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 20, 6 P.3d 1120 (quotmg Utah R. Evid.
403). Accordingly, even if Brown's prior conviction of retail theft had been offered for a
proper purpose and was relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative under the third
prong of the analysis.
To be admissible, the prior bad act evidence "must have real probative value, not
just possible worth/' United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 662 (10th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Morales-Qinnones, 812 F.2d 604, 612 (10th Cir. 1987). Even if the prior
conviction has real probative value, however, it is inadmissible if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs such probative value.
The Utah Supreme Court stated several factors, termed the Shickles factors, which
should be evaluated in determining whether to exclude evidence under rule 403. These
include: (1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, (2) the
similarities between the crimes, (3) the interval of time that has elapsed between the
crimes, (4) the need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative proof, and (6) the
degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); see also Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at \
29, 993 P.2d 837, State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990). The second and sixth
criteria are particularly applicable in this case.
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Moreover, when certain actions of a current charge are similar to a previous
conviction, unless those similarities are "peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct"
and not just of the type of crime committed the similarities between the two camiot be
found to constitute a common design or modus operandi. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6
(Utah App. 1990). There are no real similarities between Brown's prior conviction for
retail theft and the current charge, other than the type of crime committed.
In the prior conviction, Brown entered the store to return two items. After
receiving a return sticker, instead of actually returning the items, he proceeded to the
electronics depaitment and took the return sticker from one of the items and put it on an
item he had not purchased. He then attempted to leave the store and to give the
impression that he had already purchased the item since it had a return sticker attached to
it. The item remained in plain view, effectively saying to store employees that he
purchased this item.
In the current charge, Brown had batteries under a box of chicken when it was
presumed he was attempting to leave the store. He had a receipt for the chicken but not
for the batteries. The receipt would not have represented to store employees that he had
already purchased the batteries.
The State argued at trial that Brown attempted to use "deception" to commit retail
theft and that this is similar enough to prove intent or absence of mistake or accident.
However, there is no similarity between the types of "deception" used in the two cases
that would not be common in any two cases of retail theft.
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The lack of similarity between the prior conviction and the current charge also
goes to its probative value under Rule 403. Without a striking similarity, at least enough
of one to show some sort of conduct that is "peculiarly distinctive" of the defendant's
conduct, there is little probative value. However, the likelihood of prejudicial effect is
great.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that such evidence has '"tremendous potential
to sway the finder of fact unfairly' and increases the likelihood of conviction." State v.
Florez, 111 P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989). What minimal probative value the prior
conviction may have, does not outweigh the prejudicial effect. In fact, the prejudicial
effect of Brown's prior conviction substantially outweighs its slight probative value. It is
highly likely that the finder of fact heard such evidence and concluded that he was once a
thief and so he must also be a thief now. This amounts to unfair prejudice.
The trial court did not carefully balance the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect. The trial court should have concluded that the probative
value of Brown's prior convictions was slight, while the prejudicial effect of such
evidence was great. Because this error is such that there was a "reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant in its absence," Brown requests that this Court
reverse his conviction. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989).
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Brown asks that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this matter to the
trial court for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of May, 2009.

Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attomey General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 12th day of March, 2009.
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Westlaw
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Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness
State Court Rules
^gJJtah Rules of Evidence (Rets & Annos)
*iil Article IV Relevancy and Its Limits
-+ RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
except that "surprise" is not mcluded as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The change in language is not
one of substance, since "surprise" would be withm the concept of 'unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403 See
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more
appropriate method of dealmg with "surprise " See also Smith v hstelle, 445 P Supp 647 (ND Tex 1977) (surprise
use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the following Utah
cases to the same effect feny v Zions Coop Meicantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979). State v Johns, 615 P 2d
1260 (Utah 1980), Reisei v Lohneu 641 P 2d 93 (Utah 1982)
CROSS REFERENCES
Pretrial disclosure of evidence, see Rules Ci\ Pioc Rule 26

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works

Westlaw
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness
State Court Rules
*lsl Utah Rules of E\ idence (Rets & Annos)
^i=3 Aiticlc IV Rele\ anc\ and Its Limits
- • RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character e\ idence generall). Evidence ot a peison s chaiacter or a trait of charactei is not admissible for the
purpose of proMng action m conformity theiewith on a paiticular occasion except
(a)(1) Character of accused E\ idence of a putment tiait of chaiactei ottered b> an accused 01 b) the prosecution to
rebut the same or if evidence ot a ti ait of chaiactei of the alleged \ictim ot the crime is oftered b> the accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2) e\ idence of the same trait of chaiacter of the accused offered by the prosecution
(a)(2) Charactei of alleged victim E\ idence of a pertinent ti ait of chaiacter of the alleged victim of the cnme offered b} an accused 01 bv the prosecution to lebut the same oi e\ idence of a chaiactei trait of peacefulness of the
alleged A ictim ofteied by the piosecution in a homicide case to iebut e\ idence that the alleged \ ictim was the fust
aggressoi
(a)(3) Character of witness E\ idence ot the charactei of a w ltness as provided m Rules 607, 608 and 609
(b) Other crimes, >\ rongs, or acts. E\ idence of other dimes wrongs oi acts is not admissible to prove the charactei of a person in older to show action in conformit) theiew ith It ma> howe\ er be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of moti\ e opportunity intent preparation plan knowledge identity oi absence of mistake or accident, pro\ided that upon request by the accused the prosecution in a criminal case shall pro\ide reasonable notice in
ad\ ance of trial or during trial if the couit excuses pietnal notice on good cause shown, of the natuie of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases.
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is chaiged with child molestation e\ idence of the commission of
other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged piovided that
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice m advance of trial, or during tnal if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule child molestation means an act committed m relation to a child under the age of 14
which would, if committed m this state, be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense
(c)O) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or
any other rule of evidence
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992, February 11, 1998, November 1, 2001, April 1, 2008 ]
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Rule 404(a)-(b) is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the notice provisions
already in the federal rule, add the amendments made to the federal rule effective December 1, 2000, and delete language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. However, the deletion of that language is not intended to reinstate the
holding of State v Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also
conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible
The 2008 amendment adds Rule 404(c). It applies in criminal cases where the accused is charged with a sexual offense against a child under the age of 14 Before evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(c), the trial court should
conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine: (1) whether the accused committed other acts, which
if committed in this State would constitute a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense; (2) whether
the evidence of other acts tends to prove the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged; and (3) whether under Rule 403 the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, or whether
for other reasons listed in Rule 403 the evidence should not be admitted. The court should consider the factors applicable as set forth in State v Shackles, 760 P.2d 291. 295-96 (Utah 1988), which also may be applicable in determinations under Rule 404(b).
Upon the request of a party, the court may be required to provide a limiting instruction for evidence admitted under
Rule 404(4-)) or (c).
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